Episodi

  • Trump, President of U.S. v. Cook
    Jan 21 2026
    Trump, President of U.S. v. Cook | 01/21/26 | Docket #: 25A312 25A312 TRUMP V. COOK DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 2654786 THE APPLICATION FOR STAY PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM REFERRED TO THE COURT IS DEFERRED PENDING ORAL ARGUMENT IN JANUARY 2026. JURISDICTION NOTED 10/1/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:
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  • M & K Employee Solutions v. Trustees of the IAM Pension Fund
    Jan 20 2026
    M & K Employee Solutions v. Trustees of the IAM Pension Fund | 01/20/26 | Docket #: 23-1209 23-1209 M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC V. TRUSTEES OF THE IAM PENSION FUND DECISION BELOW: 92 F.4th 316 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Employee Retirement Income Security Act imposes "withdrawal liability" when an employer withdraws from an underfunded multiemployer pension plan. This withdrawal liabilty covers the employer's share of the plan's underfunding. Because a plan's amount of underfunding hinges on projections about its projected liabilities and assets decades into the future, withdrawal liability computations are partly a product of actuarial assumptions about anticipated interest rates and other predictions. Withdrawal liability must be computed "as of the end of the plan year preceding the plan year in which the employer withdraws." E.g., 29 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2)(E)(i). The question presented is: Whether 29 U.S.C. 1391's instruction to compute withdrawal liability "as of the end of the plan year" requires the plan to base the computation on the actuarial assumptions to which its actuary subscribed at the end of the year, or allows the plan to use different actuarial assumptions that were adopted after the end of the year . LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-7157, 22-7158, 23-7028 THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER 29 U. S. C. § 1391 ’ S INSTRUCTION TO COMPUTE WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY “ AS OF THE END OF THE PLAN YEAR ” REQUIRES THE PLAN TO BASE THE COMPUTATION ON THE ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS TO WHICH ITS ACTUARY SUBSCRIBED AT THE END OF THE YEAR, OR ALLOWS THE PLAN TO USE DIFFERENT ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS THAT WERE ADOPTED AFTER THE END OF THE YEAR. Order of July 3, 2025: The order granting the petition for a writ of certiorari is amended as follows. THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER 29 U. S. C. §1391 ’ S INSTRUCTION TO COMPUTE WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY “ AS OF THE END OF THE PLAN YEAR ” REQUIRES THE PLAN TO BASE THE COMPUTATION ON THE ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS MOST RECENTLY ADOPTED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, OR ALLOWS THE PLAN TO USE DIFFERENT ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS THAT WERE ADOPTED AFTER, BUT BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE AS OF, THE END OF THE YEAR. CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025
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  • Wolford v. Lopez
    Jan 20 2026
    Wolford v. Lopez | 01/20/26 | Docket #: 24-1046 24-1046 WOLFORD V. LOPEZ DECISION BELOW: 116 F.4th 959 LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen , 597 U.S. 1, 33 (2022), holds that "the Second Amendment guarantees a general right to public carry" of arms, meaning ordinary, law-abiding citizens may "'bear' arms in public for self-defense." In this case, the Ninth Circuit sustained a Hawaii law that makes it a crime for a concealed carry permit holder to carry a handgun on private property unless he has been "given express authorization to carry a firearm on the property by the owner, lessee, operator, or manager of the property." H.R.S. § 134-9.5. That holding is in acknowledged direct conflict with the Second Circuit's holding in Antonyuk v. James , 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024), a decision that struck down an identical State law in the same procedural posture as this case. The Ninth Circuit also sustained a multitude of other location bans on carry by permit holders, relying solely on post-Reconstruction Era and later laws. That doctrinal approach is in direct conflict with the Third Circuit's decision in Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police , 125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir. 2025), the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Connelly , 117 F.4th 269 (5th Cir. 2024), the Eighth Circuit's decision in Worth v. Jacobson , 108 F.4th 677 (8th Cir. 2024), and, most recently, the Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision in NRA v. Bondi , No. 21- 12314, 2025 WL 815734 at *5 (11th Cir. March 14,2025) (en banc), all of which hold that primary focus must be on Founding generation laws and tradition in applying the text, history and tradition test Bruen mandates. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding, in direct conflict with the Second Circuit, that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit the carry of handguns by licensed concealed carry permit holders on private property open to the public unless the property owner affirmatively gives express permission to the handgun carrier? 2. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in solely relying on post-Reconstruction Era and later laws in applying Bruen 's text, history and tradition test in direct conflict with the holdings of the Third, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-16164
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  • Galette v. NJ Transit Corp.
    Jan 14 2026
    Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | 01/14/26 | Docket #: 24-1021 24-1021 GALETTE V. NJ TRANSIT CORP. DECISION BELOW: 332 A.3d 776 THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED, LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THE NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION IS AN ARM OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY FOR INTERSTATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY PURPOSES. CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-1113 . ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 19,2025 : THE TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 15 , 2025 , IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK COUNTY, IS THEREFORE STAYED PENDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE MANDATE OF THIS COURT IN NJ TRANSIT CORP., ET AL. V. COLT, JEFFREY, ET AL. , CASE NO. 24- 1113 , AND GALETTE, CEDRIC V. NJ TRANSIT CORP. , CASE NO. 24-1021 . CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation is entitled to interstate sovereign immunity under the Federal Constitution, as held by the highest court of Pennsylvania in square conflict with the highest court of New York. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 4 EAP 2024
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  • West Virginia v. B. P. J.
    Jan 13 2026
    West Virginia v. B. P. J. | 01/13/26 | Docket #: 24-43 24-43 WEST VIRGINIA V. B.P.J. DECISION BELOW: 98 F.4th 542 CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Like everywhere else, West Virginia schools offer separate sports teams for boys and girls. The West Virginia Legislature concluded that biological boys should compete on boys' and co-ed teams but not girls' teams. This separation made sense, the Legislature found, because of the "inherent physical differences between biological males and biological females." A parent sued on behalf of her child, B.P.J., arguing that the State must allow biological boys who identify as girls to compete on girls' teams. After extensive discovery, the district court disagreed, entering summary judgment for the State on claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. Yet a divided Fourth Circuit panel granted an injunction pending appeal. B.P.J. then beat and displaced hundreds of girls in track and field. Ultimately, the same divided panel ruled in B.P.J.'s favor on the Title IX claim and vacated the district court's judgment for the defendants on the equal-protection claim. Judge Agee dissented, criticizing the majority for "inappropriately expand[ing] the scope of the Equal Protection Clause and upend[ing] the essence of Title IX." App.44a. He hoped this Court would "take the opportunity with all deliberate speed to resolve these questions of national importance." App.74a The questions presented are: 1. Whether Title IX prevents a state from consistently designating girls' and boys' sports teams based on biological sex determined at birth. 2. Whether the Equal Protection Clause prevents a state from offering separate boys' and girls' sports teams based on biological sex determined at birth. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1078, 23-1130
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  • Little v. Hecox
    Jan 13 2026
    Little v. Hecox | 01/13/26 | Docket #: 24-38 24-38 LITTLE, GOVERNOR OF IDAHO V. HECOX DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 1061 ORDER OF OCTOBER 20, 2025: RESPONDENT'S REQUEST THAT THE COURT DISMISS THE CASE AS MOOT IS DEFERRED PENDING ORAL ARGUMENT. SEE ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER , 601 U. S. 1, 4 (2023). CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Women and girls have overcome decades of discrimination to achieve a more equal playing field in many arenas of American life-including sports. Yet in some competitions, female athletes have become bystanders in their own sports as male athletes who identify as female have taken the place of their female competitors-on the field and on the winners' podium. The Idaho Legislature addressed that injustice by enacting the Fairness in Women's Sports Act, which ensures that women and girls do not have to compete against men and boys no matter how those men and boys identify. The Act-one of 25 such state laws around the country-is consistent with longstanding government policies preserving women's and girls' sports due to the "average real differences" between the sexes. Clark ex rel. Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982). Breaking with this Court's precedents, its own caselaw, other circuit decisions, and biological reality, the Ninth Circuit panel here upheld an injunction against the Act because it prevents "transgender women and girls"-meaning males who identify as women and girls-from competing in "women's student athletics." App.4a-5a. The question presented is: Whether laws that seek to protect women's and girls' sports by limiting participation to women and girls based on sex violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 20-35813, 20-35815
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  • Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish
    Jan 12 2026
    Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish | 01/12/26 | Docket #: 24-813 24-813 CHEVRON USA INC. V. PLAQUEMINES PARISH DECISION BELOW: 103 F.4th 324 January 8 , 2026 JUSTICE ALITO WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE. CERT. GRANTED 6/16/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: This petition arises from Louisiana parishes' efforts to hold petitioners liable in state court for, inter alia , production of crude oil in the Louisiana coastal zone during World War II. Petitioners removed these cases from state court under 28 U.S.C. §1442 (a)(1), which as amended in 2011 provides federal jurisdiction over civil actions against "any person acting under [an] officer" of the United States "for or relating to any act under color of such office." The Fifth Circuit unanimously held that petitioners satisfy the statute's "acting under" requirement by virtue of their WWII-era contracts to supply the federal government with high-octane aviation gasoline ("avgas"). But the panel divided on the "relating to" requirement, with the two-judge majority holding that petitioners' wartime production of crude oil was "unrelated" to their contractually required refinement of that same crude into avgas because the contracts did not contain any explicit "directive pertaining to [petitioners'] oil production activities." App.38. Judge Oldham dissented, explaining that the majority's approach reinstates a variant of the "causal nexus" requirement that multiple circuits (and the U.S. Congress) have expressly rejected. The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by a vote of 7 to 6. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a causal-nexus or contractual-direction test survives the 2011 amendment to the federal-officer removal statute. 2. Whether a federal contractor can remove to federal court when sued for oil-production activities undertaken to fulfill a federal oil-refinement contract. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-30294, 23-30422
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  • FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund
    Dec 10 2025
    FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund | 12/10/25 | Docket #: 24-345 24-345 FS CREDIT CORP. V. SABA CAPITAL MASTER FUND, LTD. DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 3174971 CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The courts of appeals have split 2-1 over whether Congress created an implied private right of action in Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act (ICA), which provides: (1) A contract that is made, or whose performance involves, a violation of this subchapter ... is unenforceable by either party .... (2) To the extent that a contract described in paragraph (1) has been performed, a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b)(1)-(2). The Third and Ninth Circuits, relying on statutory text and structure, hold that Section 47(b) does not create an implied private right of action, and a panel of the Fourth Circuit has agreed in an unpublished opinion. Only the Second Circuit-where plaintiffs may be able to sue most investment funds subject to the ICA, given New York's and the New York Stock Exchange's roles in financial operations- holds the opposite based on an "inference": parties may bring a lawsuit under Section 47(b), even though Congress never said so. The question presented is whether Section 47(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (b), creates an implied private right of action. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-8104, 24-79, 24-80, 24-82, 24-83, 24-116, 24-189
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