TechSpective Podcast copertina

TechSpective Podcast

TechSpective Podcast

Di: Tony Bradley
Ascolta gratuitamente

Offerte di stagione | 0,99 €/mese per i primi 3 mesi

A seguire 9,99 €/mese – si applicano condizioni. Puoi disdire mensilmente.
A proposito di questo titolo
The TechSpective Podcast brings together top minds in cybersecurity, enterprise tech, AI, and beyond to share unique perspective on technology—unpacking breakthrough trends like zero trust, threat intelligence, AI-enabled security, ransomware’s geopolitical ties, and more. Whether you’re an IT pro, security exec, or simply tech‑curious, each episode blends expert insight with real-world context—from microsegmentation strategies to the human side of cyber ethics. But we also keep it fun, sometimes riffing on pop‑culture debates like Star Wars vs. Star Trek or Xbox vs. PS—so it’s not all dry and serious.2025 Bradley Strategy Group, Inc. Politica e governo
  • The Hidden Cost of AI Pen Testing
    Nov 18 2026
    Years ago, my mother-in-law had a computer that seemed to catch every virus making the rounds. She had two or three different anti-malware products running at the same time, and she still got infected on a regular basis. I wasn't running anything, and I wasn't getting infected. Stacking more security tools on that machine didn't make her any safer, but it did give her more pop-ups. AI-powered penetration testing has a version of that same trap built into it. Vendors keep rolling out agentic pen testing tools, and they're getting very good at finding things. That's where the cost nobody puts on the price sheet starts to pile up. Why Security Teams Want AI Pen Testing Companies used to be able to make a rough guess at how fast the attack surface would change, because a certain number of developers could only write so much code. AI coding tools have thrown that math out the window. Applications now change faster than security teams can keep up, and the traditional pen test hasn't kept pace. Most organizations test their crown jewel applications once or twice a year. That leaves all the releases in between, plus the other 400 or 500 applications and assets that never got crown jewel treatment. Historically, that long tail got a scanner and a crossed finger or two. Braden Russell, CTO at Bugcrowd, told me that AI agents have raised the floor on what automation can detect by orders of magnitude. Agents can run broad testing across that whole long tail and return deeper, higher-quality results than legacy scanners ever did. They also don't sleep, and they can keep threat models current in a CI/CD world where a new build ships every day. Somebody Has to Validate the Findings All that breadth comes with a lot of noise, though. Most security pros have chased a suspicious file down a rabbit hole, pushing it to VirusTotal and digging through it, only to find out it was harmless the whole time. Multiply that by thousands of AI-generated findings, and you get a sense of the problem. Russell, who has also written about the hidden cost of agentic pentesting, pointed out something the market doesn't talk about much. Many of these platforms proved themselves by climbing leaderboards on bug bounty and vulnerability disclosure programs, and those programs already had a triage layer between the agent and the customer. When a company just licenses the AI tool on its own, that layer goes away, and the job lands on the security team. Instead of a force multiplier, Russell said, "it's just giving me a whole lot more work." His suggestion is to ask a vendor what happens between an agent finding something and your team seeing it. If the answer amounts to dumping raw findings in your lap, then by his description, "you're paying to be the validation layer for that platform." Bugcrowd's approach with Savant Pathseeker, its agentic pentesting product, is to run findings through the same human and automated triage process it uses for its bug bounty programs. The human-in-the-loop argument has a flip side, too. If you could validate every AI result by hand, you wouldn't need the AI in the first place. The USDA doesn't inspect every pound of ground beef. It spot-checks samples and makes a call on the batch. Validating AI findings is going to look a lot more like that, so somebody has to decide what gets checked and how. Building It Yourself Costs More Than the Model Some security teams figure they have access to the same frontier models as everyone else, so why not wire up a harness and build their own? Russell says teams learn a lot by doing it. The model is the easy part, though. Somebody has to manage credentials at multiple permission levels, because the unauthenticated attack surface is a small slice of the whole thing. Logging in through an SSO or identity provider can send the agent out to someone else's infrastructure, and suddenly the agent may be testing systems you don't own. Staging and production are rarely as identical as people like to think, and plenty of breach-causing misconfigurations only exist in production. Maintenance adds up, too. Every new model release means checking whether the results are still as good as they were last time. Running a frontier model for recon and report writing also burns money on routine work that a cheaper model could handle. "There's a whole lot more to the car around the engine," Russell said. Where Humans Still Fit Agents still struggle with intent. An agent can tell you an endpoint accepts negative numbers, and it can tell you the app issues refunds, but it may not connect those two facts into a refund for something nobody bought. Regulated environments and audits also still want a person's name on the report. I expect that balance to shift over time. The first time I used adaptive cruise control, I kept my hands right next to the wheel, and now I'm perfectly happy riding in a Waymo. AI pen testing will earn more trust as it proves itself, but humans will keep finding novel attacks ...
    Mostra di più Mostra meno
    41 min
  • Steering Autonomous Agents Toward the Safe Route
    Nov 11 2026
    If you’ve driven a newer car with lane-keeping assist, you know how it feels. You drift a little toward the line, and the steering wheel pushes back just enough to nudge you back into your lane. It doesn’t take the wheel away from you, and it doesn’t make you ask permission every time you want to change lanes. It knows where the road is and keeps you from wandering off of it while you’re still doing 70 on the highway. That’s close to what organizations need from security for autonomous AI agents, and it’s a lot harder to build than it sounds. Yuval Zacharia, co-founder and CEO of Bay Security, joins me on this episode of the TechSpective Podcast to talk about what it takes to let agents move at full speed without ending up in a ditch. Agents Go Wrong Without Being Compromised Most of the security stack assumes there’s an adversary somewhere. Firewalls, endpoint protection, and identity management were all built to keep bad guys out or catch them using stolen credentials. Agents complicate that picture, because an agent can do something harmful while working exactly as designed. As Yuval put it, “They don’t have to be compromised in order to go wrong.” Give an agent a vague prompt and broad permissions, and it’ll often take the shortest path to finishing the job, even when that path is something no security person would approve. And agents usually have broad permissions, because they inherit them from the user who installed them. That means access to files you forgot existed, secrets stored on the machine, and whatever SaaS apps you’re signed into. Attackers have noticed this as well, and an agent that reads your email on your behalf will also read instructions someone hid inside a message, and it may act on them. Identity and access management has spent years sorting out who has access to what, and agents add another layer on top of that, which is whether a given action should be happening right now, given what the person actually asked for. Approving Every Step Doesn’t Scale Keeping a human in the loop sounds like a reasonable safety net, and it makes a nice sound bite, but the whole reason to use AI is that it moves faster than people can, and if a human has to sign off on every tool call and every file access, you’ve slowed the whole thing back down to human speed. Anyone who’s clicked through a cookie consent banner knows how this plays out, because nobody reads them and everybody clicks “accept all.” Approval prompts for agents end up the same way. Blocking AI tools outright doesn’t work any better. I remember when companies banned Dropbox and personal Gmail, and employees just found another tool. AI is the same game of whack-a-mole, only worse, because there are always more models, plugins, and connectors than any security team can keep up with, and AI is now built into the software companies already use. Guardrails That Ride Along With approval prompts and blocking both falling short, Bay’s approach is to steer the agent instead, with guardrails inside the agent’s session, in line and in real time, wherever the agent happens to be running. That could be a coding assistant on a developer’s laptop or a long-running agent on a cloud server that keeps working after everyone has gone home. Bay’s platform is designed to understand the organization’s policies and the intent behind the original request, then compare that against what the agent is actually doing. If someone asks an agent to summarize their inbox and it starts gathering credentials from the machine, the actions don’t line up with the request. That’s the moment to nudge the agent back into its lane or stop it entirely, before anything leaves the building, instead of chasing an alert after the fact. The guardrails also need to fit the work. What’s normal for a developer’s coding agent might be a red flag for an agent working in finance, so a single policy for everyone either blocks too much or misses too much. Yuval expects a future where each employee runs dozens of agents, many of them without anyone watching in real time, and that only works if the steering happens automatically. Reasoning about intent is hard, though. A system that guesses wrong too often will flood people with false alarms and bring back the same approval fatigue it was supposed to fix. Where to Start Yuval’s advice for organizations starts with finding out which agents and tools people are already using, along with the ones they should be using but aren’t. She suggested security teams “influence the AI adoption and not just be there and observe it.” From there, check how those agents are configured, get rid of plaintext credentials sitting where an agent can grab them, and sandbox what you can. Then put guardrails in place that can tell whether what an agent is doing matches what it was asked to do. Agents are already running across most businesses whether security teams sanctioned them or not, so the ...
    Mostra di più Mostra meno
    32 min
  • Earning Trust in the Age of AI Agents
    Nov 4 2026
    Every time Claude stops in the middle of a task to ask permission to open a file or read an email, I get two choices. I can allow it once, or I can allow it always. I click "allow once" pretty much every time. I understand that "allow always" would make things smoother down the road, but it also opens the door to the kind of mistake you can't take back, and I'm not ready to hand over that much on faith. Businesses are facing the same decision, just on a much bigger scale. Rishi Bhargava, co-founder of Descope, joined me on a recent episode of the TechSpective Podcast, and our conversation kept circling back to how much access an AI agent should get, and how it earns more. Lessons From Driver-Assist Technology Rishi compared it to the evolution of driver-assist technology, which is an analogy I've used myself. The first time you turn on adaptive cruise control, you don't let the car roll up on the bumper in front of you while you check your phone. Your foot hovers over the brake while the car proves itself, and over time you relax. I trust adaptive cruise control now, to the point that it's become a problem when I rent a car that doesn't have it, set the cruise, and realize this car has no intention of slowing down for the traffic ahead. AI agents should earn access the same way. Rishi has been giving agents more access over time, but he still isn't comfortable letting one into his email. "Once you have e-mail access, you have everything," he said, since email is the reset button for nearly every other account. Giving Each Agent Its Own Identity Building trust gradually only works if you can tell the agent apart from the person who gave it the assignment, and that's where a lot of organizations fall short. Many agents today run on system credentials or borrow the identity of the user who launched them. When something goes wrong, the logs can't tell you who actually did what. That takes me back to my days as a network admin, when we spent a lot of energy telling people to stop using shared accounts. If ten people log in to a server with the same admin credentials, the audit trail is useless. A shared agent used by a whole marketing team creates the same blind spot. Rishi argues that agent identity has to be treated as "a first-class citizen," with agents acting on a user's behalf rather than as the user. In the model he described, each agent gets a unique identity, starts with limited default permissions, goes through an approval workflow, and leaves an audit trail for everything it does. When it needs more access, it asks, and someone with the authority to approve or deny it makes the call. Accountability ends up shared between the IT and security teams who set the policies and the user who approves the agent's task. That only works if the agent is visible in the first place, which is a challenge when employees are spinning up tools on their own. It feels a lot like the early days of BYOD and SaaS apps, when users moved faster than IT could keep up. Where Trust in Agents Is Heading I can see a day when I tell an agent it's handled my email 150 times without a problem and it can stop asking. Rishi expects trust to keep growing, much like it did with cloud infrastructure, and he expects agents to get access to systems without ever seeing a password. More trust doesn't take the human off the hook, though. Whoever turned the agent loose is still responsible for what it does, even when the agent made the call on its own. Whether I'll ever let an agent make payments on my behalf is another matter. I don't see it right now, but I'm not sure I plan to die on that hill. To learn more, watch or listen to the full episode:
    Mostra di più Mostra meno
    36 min
adbl_web_anon_alc_button_suppression_t1
Ancora nessuna recensione