Bestek - de Aanbestedingspodcast copertina

Bestek - de Aanbestedingspodcast

Bestek - de Aanbestedingspodcast

Di: mr. dr. Willem A. Janssen
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Podcast by mr. dr. Willem A. JanssenAll rights reserved Politica e governo Scienza Scienze sociali
Episodi
  • #45 Can You Actually Enforce an Arbitration Win Against a Government?

    #45 Can You Actually Enforce an Arbitration Win Against a Government?
    Oct 19 2026
    In this Bestek aperitif episode, Dr Marta Andhov continues a discussion from the PurpLE Project Conference panel “Arbitration in Public Contracts” (Copenhagen, June 2026) by focusing on whether arbitral awards in public contract disputes can actually be enforced against contracting authorities. She distinguishes between winning an arbitration and getting paid, and features panel insights from Cesar Pareira (President, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, São Paulo), Roxana Vornicu (Senior Lecturer, King’s College London; Sîrbu and Vornicu Law, Romania), and Nicholas Jobidon (Professor of Public Law, Université du Québec). The episode explains that arbitration’s authority stems from party agreement but its legal effect comes from state law (often like a court judgment); that courts remain essential for coercive enforcement; and that enforcement is generally recognised though subject to procedural challenges. It also highlights arbitration’s speed and international enforceability under the 1958 New York Convention, while warning arbitration can become a “trap” if governments lack political will to comply.
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    10 min
  • #44 Should Public Contracts Even Be Allowed to Go to Arbitration?

    #44 Should Public Contracts Even Be Allowed to Go to Arbitration?
    Oct 6 2026
    In this solo “aperitif” episode of Bestek, Marta Andhov shares highlights from the closing panel on arbitration in public contracts at the PurpLE Conference on Public Procurement and Contracts in Copenhagen, chaired by Peter Trepte (University of Nottingham), supported by the Dreyers Foundation and funded by the Carlsberg Foundation. The episode focuses on the threshold question of whether public contract disputes should be allowed to go to arbitration, given its implications for cost, speed, expertise, and the tension between confidentiality and transparency. Roxana Vornicu (King’s College London; Sîrbu and Vornicu Law, Romania) argues that arbitration fits internationalised construction supply chains and that confidentiality can align with protections already found in procurement law. Cesar Pareira (Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, São Paulo) emphasises efficiency and fairness, and later stresses that transparency in state contract arbitration is essential for public scrutiny and trust. Nicholas Jobidon (Université du Québec) warns against removing judicial review and notes that arbitration is useful but not for every case. Miguel Assis Raimundo (University of Lisbon) compares France, Spain, and Portugal and suggests that stronger institutional architecture can address many of the fears around arbitration. Marta closes by drawing the threads together, concluding that the panel offers no flat yes or no, and that the answer comes down to conditions, not a verdict.
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    11 min
  • #55 Wat voorafging aan het voorstel voor een aanbestedingsverordening

    #55 Wat voorafging aan het voorstel voor een aanbestedingsverordening
    Sep 1 2026
    In deze aflevering bespreken Matanja en Willem de evaluatie van de aanbestedingsrichtlijnen en ook de impact assesment van de Europese Commissie. Uit de discussie volgt binnen welke context de hervorming van de Europese aanbestedingsregels plaatsvinden. Luister deze aflevering samen met #52 Nieuwe aanbestedingsrichtlijnen of toch verordeningen? Let op: de opname vond plaats voordat een concept van de nieuwe Aanbestedingsverordening uitlekte.
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    27 min
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